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Abstract 
 
How do the words we use to talk about politics influence political attitudes and evaluations? I 
focus specifically on negative affective language; words which individuals have pre-existing 
negative reactions towards. Considering the Affect Infusion Model (AIM), processing style 
influences how individuals use affect when making decisions. The impact of affective language 
depends upon the complexity of the decision. In simpler processing tasks, individuals will use 
affect as a heuristic. This causes a misattribution of generalized negative affect onto a political 
target, leading to harsher evaluations. When a decision is complex, affective language influences 
how new information is stored in memory, along with improving information recall and abstract 
thinking. For those who are exposed to negative affective language, negative evaluations of 
politicians persist more strongly in memory, while these evaluations fade away when affect is 
used as a heuristic.  
 
 
“Lightweight choker Marco Rubio looks like a little boy on stage. Not presidential material!” – Donald Trump1 
 
The words used to describe politics are often strong and affect-laden, though it is unclear how this language influences 
public opinion. This has perhaps never been so apparent than in the 2016 Presidential campaign of Donald Trump. 
Trump routinely calls his opponents lightweights, chokers, losers and liars – all words that individuals have strong 
negative reactions towards.  I argue that these words, or negative affective language, will influence how the public 
makes decisions about policies and political figures, above and beyond the effects of pure negativity. When Trump 
characterizes Rubio as a choker, or Ted Cruz as a liar, or Jeb Bush as a loser, he uses words that individuals have pre-
existing negative reactions towards. These words should be more powerful than simply criticizing an opponent’s 
policy or record, as they should create connections between the politician and ideas that individuals already have about 
things they do not like.  For example, seeing a political figure described as a “cancer” will activate negative thoughts 
one has stored about cancer, inducing a generalized negative mood. Such negative affective words are words which 
individuals have negative reactions towards, regardless of context (Bradley and Lang 1999). The negative mood 
created by these words should be misattributed to the political concepts that are described using affective language.  
 
The context of the decision matters as well. When a decision is simple, affective language influences decision making 
in the short term; while the negative mood persists, the political figures will be judged more harshly, though this effect 
will not continue for very long. When a decision is more difficult to make, affective language will influence how 
information is stored in memory, which leads to longer lasting effects on political judgments.  
 
Political language has recently been shown to frequently have an affective component. From traditional media such 
as the New York Times (Young and Soroka 2011) to newer media such as political blogs and Twitter (Vatrapu et al. 
2009; Tumasjan et al. 2010), political information often takes on an affective tone, which is more often than not 
negative. Negative information has been shown to have a considerably stronger effect on attitudes than positive 
                                                          
1 Quoted from a tweet on February 26, 2016. 
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information (Pratto and John 1991; Baumeister et al. 2001), especially negative political information (Miller 2010; 
Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson 2010). However, negative information need not always be overt. Negative rhetoric 
about a politician or policy should be impactful, but the words chosen to describe political events should matter as 
well. I argue that using negative affective language, for example, referring to a debate as “ugly” rather than 
“contentious,” will induce a negative mood in individuals, making negative information more powerful.  
 
If political decision making is being influenced by affective language, this brings to light important normative concerns 
for political scientists, and anyone interested in politics generally. Typically, the role of generalized affect in decision 
making is operationalized as a diffuse mood created by something clearly irrelevant to politics, and often out of the 
control of political elites.  However, political news or rhetoric that uses affective language is not as plainly irrelevant, 
and can easily be manipulated by political elites. If politicians can use language to create a mood that makes the masses 
like them more, or their opponents less, this is problematic for democracy. The use of affective language also may 
have unintended consequences for politicians who make attacks. This may be seen anecdotally in the 2016 campaign. 
While Trump has been successful in securing the Republican nomination, he also has to deal with unprecedented 
unfavorability ratings. If affective language creates a generalized negative mood, it should lead to more negative 
evaluations of all politicians involved, whether it is a campaign attack or a single politician criticizing a bill. This goes 
beyond previous research on negativity, such as backlash effects on accusers (see Garramone 1984), as negative mood 
should effect all candidates equally. I examine distinct situations where affective language should matter, and 
processing style should differ: in evaluations of a negatively assessed policy and in evaluations of political candidates 
involved in campaign mudslinging.  
 
How Affect Influences Judgments – The Affect Infusion Model 
 
When individuals are asked to arrive at an opinion about a political object, they will draw on the various considerations 
about that object they have in their minds (Zaller 1992). When individuals receive political information intertwined 
with affective language, this language should create a particular mood, giving them another consideration that seems 
relevant. The affect infusion model (AIM) specifies the conditions under which individuals adopt particular cognitive 
strategies, and how affect operates in these contexts (Forgas 1995).  The AIM has two key assumptions about 
judgments: that the influence of mood on judgment is dependent upon the information processing strategy used, and 
that individuals will adopt the least effortful processing strategy possible (Forgas 1995).  Mood is likely to influence 
decision making in circumstances in which an open, constructive style of information processing is used (Fiedler 
1991).  Indeed, more complex or atypical processing tasks have been found to increase the influence of affect on 
judgments (Fiedler 1991, Forgas 1992). Considering these assumptions, one must consider what processing strategies 
are available, and which strategies would make affect infusion more or less likely to occur. 
 
A simple form of information processing is heuristic processing, which occurs when a target is simple or typical and 
the judgment is not highly personally relevant to an individual (Forgas 1995).  Heuristic processing is not a deep 
processing style, and individuals using heuristic processing typically lack the motivation, resources, or both to engage 
in deeper processing (Schwarz and Clore 1983, Eich et al. 2008). This processing is still open and constructive, since 
individuals lack prior information on which to base their judgment, but they are still trying to arrive at a judgment 
with minimal effort (Forgas 1995, Paulhus and Lim 1994).  In this situation, affective states can influence judgment. 
Individuals often think “how do I feel about this?” as a heuristic, and this heuristic serves to guide their opinions 
(Schwarz and Clore 1988, Clore and Isbell 2001).  In heuristic processing affective states guide judgments through a 
misattribution of feelings. If an individual is able to adopt a heuristic processing style, considering the goal of effort 
minimization, it should be adopted over a more complex processing strategy. When individuals engage in heuristic 
processing, negative affective language should make political evaluations more negative in the short term, but not in 
the long term, as little effort is being expended in the decision making process.  Some judgment tasks, however, are 
not conducive to heuristic processing, and a constructive processing style must be adopted.  
 
When a task is demanding or complex, individuals must adopt a constructive processing strategy (Forgas 1995). 
Constructive processing is the most effortful form of processing, and is “adopted only when simpler and less effortful 
processing strategies prove inadequate to the judgmental task” (Forgas 1995, p. 47).  The AIM predicts that, when 
constructive processing is used, affect infusion and mood congruence should increase since the judgment requires 
more effortful and elaborate information processing (Forgas 1995, Eich et al. 2008). Since individuals retrieve 
information that is congruent with their current affective state (Bower 1981), this should create an even stronger 
influence of mood than when individuals use less effortful heuristic processing.  
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Still, the effect of mood may be different: those who engage in less effortful processing should use their feelings only 
as a heuristic. In constructive processing, decisions are not arrived at as easily. Mood is likely to bias the search for 
information in one’s memory, but given the more effortful cognitive processing, the use of mood as a heuristic for 
judgments could be muted. However, information should be encoded in memory more congruently with one’s mood. 
While affective language might influence quick judgments more strongly, affective language in a constructive 
processing scenario may have more long term consequences for politicians, since new information about them will be 
encoded more negatively when negative affective language is used2.  
 
Considering this, affect should influence judgments and behaviors differently depending on the processing style used. 
In heuristic processing, individuals make only a partial, or possibly no, search for more information in memory, while 
in constructive processing, individuals make an extensive and detailed search in memory (Forgas 1995).  Negative 
affect, in particular, should have distinct consequences for how information is processed under effortful processing. 
Negative information is easier for individuals to recall (Baumeister et al. 2001). When in a negative mood, individuals 
have a stronger focus on searching memory for external information (Bless and Fiedler 2006). Negative affect also 
improves both the coding and retrieval of information in memory (Forgas, Laham, and Vargas 2005; Forgas, 
Goldenberg, and Unkelbach 2008), and increases cognitive elaboration (Bless et al. 1990). Negative affect has distinct 
consequences for constructive information processing: individuals should better recall information and also recall 
more external information they deem relevant to the judgment at hand.  
 
This relates to work by Daniel Kahneman on System 1 and System 2 information processing. Kahneman argues that 
System 1 processing is fast, automatic and emotional, while System 2 processing is slow, effortful and logical 
(Kahneman 2011). However, if affect is truly infused with how judgements are formed, it may be difficult for 
individuals to separate these affective judgments even when engaged in a constructive, system 2 type of processing. 
When new information is stored in memory, under the Affect Infusion Model, this information is stored with the 
affective judgments individuals have made about it (Forgas 1995, Eich et al. 2008). In this case, even logical 
processing should be driven by affect indirectly. If affect influences how information is stored, this should be seen as 
“facts” by an individual when they retrieve this information. Considering these two models, when an individual makes 
quick judgments, affect is simply a heuristic. When individuals make slower, more effortful judgments, affect should 
influence judgments to the extent that it influences how information is stored in memory.  
 
Affect has been shown to be influence judgment in many scenarios. Negative moods induced by various external 
means, including the weather, sporting events or films, cause individuals to evaluate their own lives more negatively 
(Forgas and Bower 1987, Forgas and Moylan 1987, Schwarz and Clore 1983, Schwarz et al. 1987), and negative 
external events have been shown to decrease support for incumbent politicians (Achen and Bartels n.d., Healy, 
Malhotra and Mo 2010).  Priming individuals with a negative word, or with a photo of a prominent politician, can 
influence evaluations of other political candidates (Weinberger and Westen 2008). Brader (2006) finds that cues to 
discrete emotions like enthusiasm and fear can influence political attitudes, but his work focuses on discrete emotions 
rather than generalized affect. Fighting words, or violent metaphors, can increase preference for violent political 
action, especially among those with high levels of trait aggression (Kalmoe 2014). From this work, it is clear that both 
generalized affect and word choice matter in how political attitudes develop, but the two avenues of research have 
remained disconnected. 
 
This research, however, often focuses on mood inductions that are artificial or out of control of political elites, or 
focuses on manipulation of discrete emotions. Here, I extend these applications to examine the words used in political 
rhetoric to determine how words that do not focus on discrete emotions can influence political attitudes. 
 
  
                                                          
2 Previous research on effortful thinking suggests that this type of information processing leads to higher quality decision making. The elaboration 
likelihood model of information processing suggests individuals are motivated to make correct decisions, and that more effortful information 
processing leads to better decision making (Petty and Cacioppo 1981). Here, I make no judgment of the quality of decision making when 
constructive processing strategies are used. The AIM suggests that affect will bias information search, though this does not need to stand in conflict 
with this work. An individual’s mood can simply lead them to believe that certain types of information in memory are more relevant to the current 
judgment task than others, or that certain types of information are more convincing than others. 
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How Affective Language Influences Political Judgments 
 
Considering the AIM framework3, the use of affective language in political communication should influence both 
political judgments and how political information is processed. Depending on the processing style, affect will 
influence judgment in different ways: it will happen either directly through affect or indirectly through how new 
information is encoded in memory and how old information is retrieved (Forgas 1995).  This research will provide a 
new, more subtle examination of how affect can be infused with information received by an individual, and one that 
is especially relevant to politics. Rather than focusing on external or artificial mood manipulations, this study will 
examine real ways that political elites can use language to manipulate the mood of those consuming political 
information.  
 
I present results from two different experiments on affective language. I examine situations where I would expect 
either heuristic or constructive processing styles to be used. When heuristic processing is used, I expect that affect 
will influence judgments directly; when individuals are exposed to negative affective language, this will lead to more 
negative evaluations of political objects. However, I do not expect negative affective language to have any influence 
on how information is retrieved from, or stored in, memory. Since little to no information needs to be retrieved from 
memory to make the judgments, those who receive negative affective language will perform similarly on a memory 
task compared to those who receive neutral language. In a more difficult scenario, where I would expect constructive 
processing to be used, I also expect that judgments of a political object will be harsher when subjects are exposed to 
negative affective language compared to neutral language. However, I expect this effect to be more indirect. Given 
the difficulty of the decision task, individuals will think more about the decision and search their memories for relevant 
information. When constructive processing is used, I expect individuals not only to think more about their decisions, 
but also to pull in more external information and remember more factual information, since affect should improve 
memory and lead to a more detailed information search (Forgas 1995, Isen 1984, Pham 2009). 
 
Study 1 – Affect and Heuristic Processing 
 
Subjects were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk on November 9th and 10th, 2011. Subjects were offered $1 
to complete an omnibus study on public opinion; 316 subjects participated in the negative affective language portion 
of the study4. Subjects on Mechanical Turk have been shown to be more representative of the United States than most 
in-person convenience samples, even though they are typically younger, more liberal, and less wealthy (Berinsky, 
Huber and Lenz 2012).  This is true of that current sample, with a mean age of about 34 and 50% of subjects identifying 
as at least somewhat liberal, with only 28% identifying as at least somewhat conservative5. Samples drawn from 
Mechanical Turk have been shown to replicate important findings in political science and psychology (see Berinsky, 
Huber and Lenz 2012).  
 
In Study 1, subjects were assigned to one of two experimental groups. All subjects read a fictional news article6 about 
a voter identification law that they were told was being considered in another state. The tone of this article was always 
negative towards the law, even in the neutral language control group. The tone of the article is kept negative, even in 
the control group, to better test the mechanism of negative affective language. I predict that negative affective words 
should be more negative than neutral affective words, even when the overall tone of an article remains negative. To 
isolate this mechanism, the tone of the control text is kept negative, to avoid confounding the effects of negative 
affective words with a generalized negative tone. In the treatment article 18 words7 with a negative affective valence 
were included to replace 18 words with a neutral affective valence. These are words that individuals have been shown 
to have strong negative reactions towards, as coded in the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) database (see 
                                                          
3 I use a valence model for affect rather than examining discrete emotions. This valence model focuses on simple negative or positive reactions, 
rather than a discrete emotional response. Models of affect and its influence on information processing focus on a diffuse mood, rather than a 
discrete response to a particular object (Bower 1981).  This is an important distinction; given that I argue an affective response is created by 
language, a targeted emotional response would be directed at words rather than the political target. 
4 154 subjects were assigned to the neutral language control group and 162 were assigned to the negative emotional language treatment group.  
5 The mean for ideology, on a 7 point liberal to conservative scale, is 3.51. 55% of subjects are female, and 46% have a bachelor’s degree. About 
6% of the sample is African-American, and 4.8% Hispanic.  
6 Treatment texts from study 1 are available in Appendix A. 
7 Each article contains approximately 250 words, so only about 7% of the words in each article are replaced between the control and treatment 
groups. 
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Bradley and Lang 1999)8. The negative words have an average ANEW valence rating of about 2.22 (s.d. 0.47), 
considerably lower than the neutral score of 5.0.   This differs from standard mood inductions, which typically do not 
occur at the same time that information is provided. Here, I argue that mood is not specific because the affective 
language is not targeted at anything in particular: it is difficult for an individual to determine whether their negative 
feelings are directed at the bill itself, its supporters, or its opposition.  
 
In this study, I expect subjects will engage in heuristic processing. While voter identification laws have been 
considered or enacted in many states, it is an issue that has not been on the agenda for a very long time and one that 
is of relatively minor importance in people’s day to day lives. In this study, all subjects read an article that is opposed 
to the Voter ID law. If subjects have limited information about Voter ID laws, this negatively framed article should 
guide all subjects to evaluate the law negatively. However, I argue that negative affective language provides another 
piece of negative information about the law: an individual’s mood. This should lead to more negative evaluations in 
the treatment group. 
 
First, I examine how negative affect influences assessments of two political objects, the proposed Voter ID law and 
the fictional politician, Ben Griffin, mentioned in the news article. There was a difference between the negative 
language treatment and neutral language control groups in ideology, with the treatment group being more conservative. 
Given that the Voter ID legislation has a distinct ideological base of support in conservatives, the lack of balance on 
political ideology between treatment and control groups could bias my results. Additionally, this lack of balance on 
ideology is unexpected, and could indicate a lack of balance on unobservable variables. To minimize this bias, I 
present results controlling for all observed variables9 in the study. These results are presented in table I.  
 
(Table I about here) 
 
On support for the Voter ID act10, subjects in the negative affective language condition are significantly less likely to 
support the act than those in the neutral language control group. This effect, while small, is still substantively 
important, with those in the treatment rating their support of the law nearly seven points lower than those in the control. 
To put the size of this effect into perspective, the negative affective language treatment results in an effect on support 
of the Voter ID law larger than that of gender, being African-American, living in state that has enacted a Voter ID 
law, and a move from the minimum to maximum values of education and political knowledge.  
 
For politician support, I find a similar pattern. Support for Ben Griffin on a 0-100 feeling thermometer decreases by 
over 4 points for those in the negative affect language group, compared to the neutral language control. While this 
effect is again rather small, it is over 40% of the magnitude of the effect of moving from very liberal to very 
conservative. Further, this effect is especially profound when considering that those in the treatment group support 
Griffin’s stance on the Voter ID act more than those in the control. Given that this is the only information they have 
about Griffin’s ideology, these results suggest that feelings matter when individuals are asked to evaluate political 
figures. Subjects may agree with Griffin more on policy in the treatment group, but they still rate him more negatively 
on a feeling thermometer. This suggests that negative affect11 is not targeted at the law itself, but is used to bias all 
judgments made about the information learned in the article.  
 
Next, I turn to the open-ended responses to assess how information was stored in memory. I asked participants to list 
any thoughts that came to mind when they considered the Voter ID law. These responses were coded to identify 
predicted observable implications from the AIM for different processing styles. For example, negative affective 
language should influence memory recall and coding: thus, I have coded whether individuals recalled basic 
information from the article, or made a negative judgment of the Voter ID law. Since heuristic processing should be 
adopted, I expect there to be no difference between the treatment and control groups in these responses. Individuals  
 
  
                                                          
8 In the ANEW database, Bradley and Lang (1999) rate over 1000 English words on the dimensions of valence, arousal and dominance. I focus on 
the valence, or positive/negative, dimension. Words are rated on a scale of 1-9, with words rated closer to one highly negative, closer to nine highly 
positive, and those rated near five neutral. 
9 All control variables, with the exception of age, are coded 0-1. Balance checks on demographic variables are included in Appendix B. 
10 Support for the Voter ID Act was assessed on a 0-100 scale, with 100 indicating the highest level of support.  
11 Unfortunately, I did not measure negative affect in this study. However, in study 2, I do find increased negative affect among the treatment group.  
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are using affect as a heuristic, rather than having it influence their search in memory while deciding what conclusion 
to arrive at. Table II12 presents the differences in the first three responses13 to the open-ended question about the Voter 
ID law that subjects read about. 
 
(Table II about here) 
 
There is little discernible difference between those who read the story with negative affective language and those who 
read the story with neutral language on these measures. In both groups, subjects wrote approximately 130 characters, 
or roughly 43 characters per response, suggesting that negative affect does not spur increased cognitive elaboration in 
this processing task. They were also equally likely to make at least one mention of a topic not mentioned in the article, 
with about 55% of subjects in each group saying at least one thing14 about an outside topic. Here, I code outside 
mentions as any reference to something not directly mentioned in the article; these responses typically included 
references to other places where identification was required, claims about which political party supported or opposed 
the law, or claims of potential racial bias in the law. Between both groups, roughly 26% of individuals were able to 
repeat a statement made in the article, such as the law’s effect on the poor and elderly and problems with fraud in 
absentee voting. Here, I coded mentions of factual statements in the article as being made if subjects mentioned a topic 
that was discussed in the text of both articles15.  
 
Lastly, I look at instances where subjects made a statement in the open-ended responses that was negative towards the 
Voter ID law. Here, I code negative responses as any instance where subjects mention that they dislike or are opposed 
to the law. Interestingly, there was a slightly higher proportion of individuals in the neutral language control who 
expressed a negative opinion of the law than those in the negative language treatment (though, this difference does 
not approach statistical significance), 46% to 42%. This suggests that the previous responses about support of the law 
and Ben Griffin were not results of a deep thought process, but instead were quick decisions made using affect as a 
heuristic16. Negative affect should lead to more considerations of external information (Bless and Fiedler 2006) and 
better recall of relevant information (Forgas, Laham, and Vargas 2005) when a more effortful processing approach is 
taken. Here, we see that is simply not the case, suggesting that individuals are using the faster, more superficial 
heuristic processing style when making this judgment. It appears that subjects are not attaching their feelings to the 
Voter ID law when storing it in memory, causing the influence of affective language to dissipate when they are later 
asked to engage in a more cognitively challenging task. 
 
Study 2 – Affect and Constructive Processing 
 
For study 2, subjects were recruited both on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and from undergraduate political science 
courses at a private, Southern university in March 2012. Subjects from Mechanical Turk were paid $2.50 for an 
omnibus study on public opinion, which took about 30 minutes to complete. Student subjects completed the same 
study in a laboratory on campus in exchange for course credit. A total of 281 student subjects and 248 non-students 
completed the study, for a total n of 529 subjects17. Of these, 426 were assigned to either the treatment or control 
group for the current study18. Subjects were rather similar across the two modes of study with regards to gender, race 
and ideology – approximately 53% of subjects were female, 7% African-American, 5% Hispanic and both groups 
leaned slightly liberal, though not largely so. As expected, there were differences in age; subjects on Mechanical Turk 
had an average age of about 35, while subjects in the lab had an average age of about 20.  
  
                                                          
12 Regression models with a full set of controls provide similar results, and are available in the reviewer’s appendix.  
13 Subjects could give a maximum of seven total responses. For ease of comparability to Study 2, I have restricted this analysis only to the first 
three responses.  
14 Here, I look at the proportions of individuals who mentioned a topic not in the article, recalled a fact from the article, or said something negative 
about the law in at least one of the first three responses, compared to those who made no mention of these.  
15 I excluded, for example, references to “dead” voters, since it is unclear if that is mentioning an abstract thought (in the control group) or recalling 
information (in the treatment group).  
16 One could argue that negative affective language simply provides a stronger information signal than neutral language. In this instance, I would 
expect voters to use that information in their free responses – since they have learned more negative information about the law than the control 
group, they should continue to evaluate the law more negatively even with a more complex task.  
17 In all analyses in this section, I pool subjects from the student and mturk samples. Statistical analyses on each sample individually provide similar 
results. Subjects in the lab were more like to recall information and mention abstract information than those on Mturk, while those on Mturk were 
more likely to make a negative comment about the politicians than those in the lab. In both groups, the treatment effect was similar.  
18 Subjects that did not receive an article about the political scandal are excluded from analysis.  
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In this study, subjects were first presented with brief background information about two candidates, Eric Thomas and 
Arthur Spencer, that they were told were competing in a gubernatorial election in a different state19. Afterwards, 
subjects were presented an article to provide them more information about this election. While the overall content and 
information presented in both articles was similar, subjects were randomly assigned to receive an article about 
accusations of a political scandal with neutral affective language, or a similar article including negative affective 
language, a design similar to that of study 1. Here, 36 words20 were replaced in the treatment article. These words 
have an average ANEW valence rating of 2.37 (s.d. 0.55), similar to the average rating in study 1 and again, far 
towards the negative end of the nine point ANEW valence rating scale.  
 
I expect that this study will present subjects with a more difficult judgment task than the previous study; here, subjects 
are presented with accusations of corruption against Spencer by Thomas; Spencer then denies these charges. This 
judgment task is designed to be difficult – there is no certainty as to which politician is telling the truth, forcing subjects 
to make that evaluation on their own. Given that this is a fictional election, subjects have no pre-existing attitudes 
towards the election, making the task more challenging. Because of this, subjects must spend some time deliberating 
– there are no easy cues such as proof of who is correct or partisanship upon which to base their decisions. Such 
deliberation, however, has been shown to have no effect on the quality of decision making (Jackman and Sniderman 
2006); suggesting that, in this context, subjects may be especially confused on who to believe. Since I expect a 
constructive processing style to be adopted, subjects will make a detailed search in their memory when making 
evaluations (Forgas 1995). As such, I predict that affect will influence what subjects think about when considering 
this election and, contrary to a heuristic processing situation, cause differences between conditions on what they think 
about in regards to the election in an open-ended response task.  
 
(Table III about here) 
 
In this study, I included a PANAS scale to measure negative affect; this scale features five questions to measure 
negative affect that have been shown to be highly reliable (see Watson, Clark and Tellegen 1988). To measure 
generalized negative affect, subjects were asked to report the extent to which they felt afraid, upset, nervous, scared 
and distressed at that very moment, and responses to these five questions were used to create an additive index to 
measure negative affect21. Individuals in the negative affective language group report significantly higher levels of 
negative affect. This effect is rather small, a difference of only about .5 on the 20 point scale (p~.06, one-tailed), 
though overall levels of self-reported negative affect tended to be low across groups. Despite this difference in affect, 
table III shows little difference between the negative affective language and neutral language groups in their 
evaluations of the two candidates, Arthur Spencer and Eric Thomas22. Here, both candidates are rated, on average, 
near the midpoint of the feeling thermometer across groups, and subjects are roughly equally likely to say they would 
vote for Spencer or Thomas.  
 
Why does negative affective language not lead to harsher evaluations of the political candidates on these standard 
survey measures? Here, it is possible that affect is simply not being used as a heuristic, which is exactly what would 
be expected in constructive processing, where individuals think more deeply about judgments and do not simply ask 
how they feel about objects (Forgas 1995, Eich et al. 2008).  In examining the open-ended responses from subjects, it 
does appear that many take sides in the election, choosing to believe either Spencer or Thomas23. However, which 
candidate subjects support is not being influenced by the affective language treatment. Along these lines, effortful 
thinking has been shown to increase ambivalence with regards to candidate preferences (Rudolph and Popp 2007). 
Compared to the previous study, with a more simple judgment task, subjects here may be more likely to see the 
negatives in both candidates and have a harder time choosing who to side with. With this constructive processing task, 
we should see an influence of negative affective language on how individuals arrive at judgments. 
 
                                                          
19 Full text available in Appendix A. 
20 The articles were roughly 275 words long in this study, meaning approximately 13% of the words in the treatment article were negatively valenced 
words.  
21 Responses were on a five point scale, ranging from 0-4. For the negative affect measure, values theoretically range from 0 (no negative affect) 
to 20 (highest negative affect). Cronbach’s α = .89. 
22 Results presented are difference of means or difference of proportions tests. Models estimated using OLS and controls for race, age, gender, 
partisanship and ideology produce substantively and statistically similar results.  
23 There is no predictable pattern for what characteristics predict negative responses about either candidate, other than Hispanics than non-Hispanics 
make more negative comments about Spencer, and women make more negative comments than men about Thomas. Partisanship or ideology do 
not predict negative evaluations of either candidate.  
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 (Table IV about here) 
 
The results in table IV24 demonstrate that negative affective language does indeed have consequences for information 
processing and cognitive effort. When subjects are asked to list their thoughts about the election, those in the negative 
affective language condition write approximately 25 characters more over the three response options. They also spend 
about 12 seconds longer (69 seconds, compared to 57 for the control group) answering these prompts, though this 
difference is completely mediated by the increased length of their responses. Open ended responses were coded in a 
manner similar to study 1, with a focus on recall of information, mention of outside information, and negative 
responses to the candidates. 
 
Negative affective language increases the recall of factual information; roughly 24% of subjects in the treatment group 
mentioned a fact from the introduction about the candidates in their three memory responses, while only 18% of the 
neutral language group did. Those who read the article with negative affective language also mentioned external 
considerations more often, with 32% mentioning a topic not supplied in the article as coming to mind when they think 
of the election, compared to just 22% of the control group. Here, subjects typically mentioned other politicians they 
were reminded of (the most mentioned were John McCain and Mitt Romney), other political scandals, or drew 
conclusions about either candidate’s partisanship. Subjects in the negative affective language treatment also provided 
harsher assessments of both candidates in their open-ended responses, despite not rating the candidates differently on 
the feeling thermometer. Roughly 19% in the treatment group made at least one negative comment about Spencer in 
their open-ended responses, and 25% made a negative comment about Thomas, compared to only 13% and 18%, 
respectively, in the control group. Negative sentiment about Spencer often called him a liar, corrupt, and out of touch 
with the average citizen. Thomas, meanwhile, was often characterized as immature, desperate, and unwilling to focus 
on the issues. Here, we do see some evidence that affect is influencing evaluations of the candidates; those exposed 
to negative affective language have more negative things to say about both candidates25. This suggests that individuals 
are thinking about their likes and dislikes of the two candidates, and that reading an article with negative language 
leads to more dislikes about both candidates, even though this effect did not appear in the previous, more direct 
measures.  
 
Of course, there are limitations to the inferences that can be drawn from this study. While subjects received the same 
background information about both candidates in the fictional election, Spencer, the attackee, was a considerably more 
experienced candidate than Thomas, the attacker. While feeling thermometer ratings of the two candidates did not 
differ, subjects were more likely to provide negative open-ended comments about Thomas than Spencer, regardless 
of assignment to the treatment group. This may suggest that negative affective language leads to more negative 
evaluations generally, as shown in Study 1, or it may lead to more negative evaluations of the candidate being accused, 
but only lead to increased negative evaluations if the accuser if individuals do not especially care for the candidate to 
begin with. Further work is needed to adjudicate these effects.26 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
These findings provide insight into how the words used by the news media and politicians can influence political 
decision making. In an ideal world, word choice should not be relevant to how citizens evaluate politics and develop 
political attitudes. However, word choice is certainly deliberate – politicians use rhetoric strategically in ways that 
they believe will increase the general public’s support of them (Riker 1996). If what politicians say is important, how 
they say it should be important as well. When presented with information highlighting the negatives of a proposed 
policy, individuals evaluate the policy more negatively when the article includes negative affective language. In 
accordance with how affect infusion should work in a heuristic processing scenario, they also evaluate a politician 
opposed to the policy more harshly, even though they are more  in agreement with his policy stance. However, there 
is no effect of affective language on recall of information, mention of external information or negative responses 
toward the policy, suggesting affect is merely used as a heuristic. Here, subjects evaluate the policy more negatively 
when asked for a quick judgment, but are not more likely to express a negative opinion when asked to elaborate on  
  
                                                          
24 These results are robust to regression controlling for demographic characteristics.  
25 However, there are clear limitations to this study. Typically, individuals do not engage in decision making about candidates without a partisan 
cue, as they were forced to in this study. That said, the study may be especially applicable to competitive primaries, as primary elections with 
quality challengers and no incumbents are more prone to negativity (Peterson and Djupe 2005).  
26 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the potential for this effect. 
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what they think of the policy. This suggests that negative affective language can create a mood that is available for a 
quick judgment, in this scenario of heuristic processing, but this effect may not persist for long, as the policy is not 
judged any more negatively in memory. 
 
In contrast, exposure to negative affective language in a constructive processing task leads to negative reactions in 
memory. Here, a scenario where accusations are made between two political candidates leads to more negative 
evaluations of both candidates in open-ended cognitive responses when negative affective language is used, even 
though there is no difference in feeling thermometer ratings. This suggests that the consequences of negative affective 
language may be longer term in more difficult cognitive tasks. It seems that information may be encoded into memory 
differently when negative affective words are present, leading to longer lasting effects. This comports with predictions 
of both the Affect Infusion Model (Forgas 1995) and Kahneman’s system 2 information processing model (2011). 
Taken together, these results suggest that, while affective language operates differently based on the challenge of the 
information processing task, it has important consequences in general for how individuals process information and 
arrive at political decisions.  
 
Politicians, it seems, may need to be careful about using affectively charged language when making accusations. In 
this study, subjects reported more negative responses to the politician accusing misconduct compared to the one 
accused of misconduct, and these negative feelings were more prevalent when affective language was used. This 
suggests that affectively charged mudslinging may be less effective, as it damages both the attacker and the attackee.  
 
Of course, it is still possible that affective language is considered to be stronger negative information than neutral 
language, suggesting that the strength of the language is what is causing these results. Given the difference in results 
between study 1 and study 2, I believe that this is not the case. If negative affective language was simply a stronger 
information signal than neutral language, it would be difficult to explain the divergent results among the two studies. 
If negative language serves as more negative information, evaluations should be harsher regardless of processing style 
or measurement type. There are distinct differences in how affect influences political decision making depending upon 
the scenario, which aligns nicely with the predictions of the Affect Infusion Model. Taking these two studies together, 
I believe that negative mood, rather than negative information, is the route through which negative affective language 
influences political judgments. 
 
It is important to consider how long these effects persist. While existing psychological theories suggest that, in 
constructive processing tasks, affect should influence how information is coded in memory, I am unable to test this 
prediction long term. Future work should focus on the effects of affective language over the periods of days, weeks, 
and months, to test this prediction. 
 
Politicians are often in close elections, and may be looking for any avenue possible to increase support and ensure 
their election. My findings present an interesting “Catch-22” for politicians: using negative affective language can 
decrease support for a policy they don’t like, but this appears to come at the expense of increasing negative evaluations 
of the politician who is also associated with these negative words. However, in heuristic processing scenarios, this 
effect does not seem to persist very long. Politicians are also faced with a dilemma, though, when attacking their 
opponents, and perhaps one that is more damaging. The use of affective language in the context of negative 
campaigning does increase negative opinions about the target of the negative campaign, but it also increases negative 
opinions about the accuser, as well. In situations where individuals must engage in deeper processing of political 
information, such as when they must determine whether negative accusations in a political campaign are true or not, 
mood congruence does appear to occur in memory about the candidates. In the context of real political campaigns, 
this might suggest that politicians are better off using Super PACs to levy attacks against their opponent, to avoid 
association with the negative advertising and the consequences for judgments that come along with it.  
 
This work also has implications for mass polarization. If individuals differ in how they get their political information, 
and certain types of information are more affect laden, my research suggests that those who receive emotional content 
will become more polarized in their political attitudes. Given self-selection into agreeable political information (Mutz 
2006), emotional content may serve to widen the gap between liberals and conservatives, leaving those who consume 
less emotional media somewhere in the middle. This proposition is interesting, but may be difficult to test. It is still 
important to consider how different sources of political information can influence judgments.   
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There has also been considerable debate about the effects of negative advertising, with some arguing it has negative 
consequences (see Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995), and others arguing it has positive consequences (see Geer 2006). 
I add to that by suggesting that we need to go beyond the study of the message of an advertisement, but also on how 
it is delivered. With incivility on the rise (Herbst 2010), attacks could become more vitriolic and include more negative 
affective words. In this instance, it is important to consider how negativity can be enhanced and influenced by the type 
of language used. 
 
How individuals receive and process political information, and how that influences their evaluations of political 
objects, have important consequences for politics generally. I present results that suggest that when individuals are 
exposed to language that makes them feel generally negative, they also feel more negatively towards the political 
objects presented along with this language. 
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Table I. Effect of Negative Affective Language on Political Attitudes - Study 1 
 
 Support for Voter ID Law Support for Ben Griffin 
Negative Affective Language -6.97* 
(3.43) 
-4.78* 
(2.82) 
Conservative Ideology 52.58** 
(6.29) 
-11.03* 
(5.17) 
Age -0.31* 
(0.15) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
Female -3.98 
(3.62) 
0.03 
(2.98) 
Education 5.90 
(8.62) 
3.28 
(7.09) 
Income 11.42* 
(6.78) 
-8.62+ 
(5.57) 
African-American -1.40 
(7.09) 
1.43 
(5.83) 
Hispanic -15.60* 
(8.24) 
-10.22+ 
(6.77) 
Other Race -4.55 
(6.16) 
4.33 
(5.07) 
Unemployed -6.91+ 
(4.78) 
3.03 
(3.93) 
Student 9.35* 
(5.38) 
0.25 
(4.42) 
Political Knowledge 3.71 
(6.52) 
0.44 
(5.36) 
Lives in State with Voter ID 
Law 
4.48 
(3.73) 
-3.48 
(3.07) 
Constant 27.45** 
(9.76) 
62.59** 
(8.02) 
N 307 307 
R2 0.2688 0.0617 
Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, one tailed 
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Table II. Effect of Negative Affective Language on Cognitive Elaboration – Study 1 
 
 
Length of responses 
in characters 
Proportion 
mentioning topic not 
in article 
Proportion 
mentioning fact from 
article 
Proportion 
mentioning negative 
opinion of law 
Neutral Language 
129.98 
(7.36) 
0.56 
(0.04) 
0.25 
(0.04) 
0.46 
(0.04) 
Negative Language 
129.49 
(7.26) 
0.54 
(0.04) 
0.28 
(0.04) 
0.42 
(0.04) 
Difference 
-0.49 
(10.34) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
t -0.047 -0.27 0.49 -0.74 
N 316 316 316 316 
Table entries are means or proportions for each group with standard errors in parenthesis. 
+- p<.10, * - p<.05, ** - p<.01, one-tailed 
 
 
Table III. Effect of Negative Affective Language on Political Evaluations – Study 2 
 
 
Self-Reported 
Negative Affect 
FT Evaluation – 
Arthur Spencer 
FT Evaluation – Eric 
Thomas 
Proportion voting for 
Spencer 
Neutral Language 
7.26 
(0.25) 
46.64 
(1.30) 
48.02 
(1.15) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
Negative Language 
7.83 
(0.27) 
47.81 
(1.32) 
49.89 
(1.22) 
0.51 
(0.03) 
Difference 
0.57+ 
(0.36) 
1.17 
(1.85) 
1.87 
(1.68) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
t 1.58 0.63 1.11 0.58 
N 426 426 426 426 
Table entries are means or proportions for each group with standard errors in parenthesis.  
+- p<.10, * - p<.05, ** - p<.01, one-tailed 
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Table IV. Effect of Negative Affective Language on Cognitive Elaboration – Study 2 
 
 
Length of responses 
in characters 
Proportion 
mentioning topic 
not in article 
Proportion 
mentioning fact 
from introduction 
Proportion 
mentioning 
negative opinion of 
Spencer 
Proportion 
mentioning negative 
opinion of Thomas 
Neutral Language 
92.45 
(5.32) 
0.22 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.03) 
Negative Language 
117.32 
(5.96) 
0.32 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
0.19 
(0.03) 
0.25 
(0.03) 
Difference 
 24.87** 
(4.05) 
 0.10* 
(0.04) 
 0.06* 
(0.04) 
 0.06+ 
(0.04) 
 0.07* 
(0.04) 
t 2.86 2.32 1.65 1.62 1.75 
N 426 426 426 426 426 
Table entries are means or proportions for each group with standard errors in parenthesis.  
+- p<.10, * - p<.05, ** - p<.01, one-tailed 
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Appendix A – Treatment Texts 
 
Study 1 
 
C1: Neutral language condition 
 
 
 
C2: Negative affective language condition  
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Study 2 
 
Candidate Introduction 
 
 
C1: Neutral Language Condition 
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C2: Negative Affective Language Condition  
 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Balance Checks 
Study 1 
 
 Control Treatment Diff p 
Conservative Ideology 0.4 0.437 -0.037 0.25 
Age 35.7 33.3 2.45 0.08 
Female 0.552 0.586 -0.034 0.54 
Education 0.711 0.703 0.008 0.72 
Income 0.503 0.471 0.033 0.27 
African-American 0.084 0.037 0.047 0.08 
Hispanic 0.045 0.049 -0.004 0.87 
Other Race 0.078 0.111 -0.033 0.32 
Unemployed 0.169 0.154 0.015 0.73 
Student 0.104 0.191 -0.087 0.03 
Political Knowledge 0.646 0.633 0.013 0.68 
Lives in State with Voter ID Law 0.312 0.302 0.009 0.86 
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Study 2 
 
 Control Treatment Diff p 
Conservative Ideology 0.459 0.437 0.02 0.42 
Age 26.6 26.8 0.2 0.85 
Female 0.529 0.541 -0.012 0.8 
Education 0.623 0.619 0.004 0.9 
Income 0.558 0.578 -0.02 0.56 
African-American 0.067 0.087 -0.02 0.44 
Hispanic 0.048 0.078 -0.03 0.21 
Trust in Government 0.056 0.513 -0.007 0.73 
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